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A Pertinent Message for Today from Key 
Constitutional and Administrative 
Rulings of Yesterday 
VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM* 
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and debate over whether 
traditional mechanisms for adjudication can deal adequately with alleged 
perpetrators of terrorism, I’ve been pondering with apprehension Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s 1998 book All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in 
Wartime.1 
A scholarly review of historical practices confining civil liberties 
during the Civil War, World War I, and World War II is followed by the 
Chief Justice’s analysis of and rationale for judicial acceptance of the 
maxim Inter arma silent leges: In time of war the laws are silent.2  He 
predicts, if he does not quite recommend, that current and future 
Supreme Courts faced with the exigencies of war will replicate their 
predecessors’ endorsements of executive and military practices and will 
bypass judicial principles that traditionally have protected individuals 
against procedural and substantive excess by the government. 
The Chief Justice adverts explicitly to “the reluctance of courts to 
decide a case against the government on an issue of national security 
 
 *  Nathaniel L. Nathanson Professor Emeritus, Northwestern University.  This speech was delivered at the University of San Diego School of Law April 10, 2003 in the Nathaniel L. Nathanson Memorial Lecture Series.  My research assistant, Seth Feldman, contributed valuable insights and analyses to its preparation.  I’m grateful to Brittany Harrison and her San Diego Law Review staff for their vital editorial assistance.  1. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998).   
 2. See id. at 218–25. 
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during a war” and suggests that such reluctance is a “necessary evil.”3  
While declaring it “both desirable and likely” that courts will accord 
greater scrutiny in the future to governmental claims of necessity for 
curtailing civil liberties,4 he minimizes issues of “occasional presidential 
excesses and judicial restraint in wartime” as “very largely academic.  
There is no reason to think that future wartime presidents will act 
differently from Lincoln, Wilson, or Roosevelt, or that future Justices of 
the Supreme Court will decide questions differently from their 
predecessors.”5  He expects that “[t]he laws will . . . not be silent in time 
of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different voice.”6 
The “different voice” has already become audible in the Fourth 
Circuit’s January 8, 2003 disposition of the government’s appeal from 
Senior District Judge Robert Doumar’s ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
requiring production by the government of materials regarding Hamdi’s 
status as an alleged enemy combatant.7  Hamdi, a U.S. citizen who was 
captured in Afghanistan, detained initially in Afghanistan, then in 
Guantanamo Bay, and subsequently transferred to the Norfolk Naval 
Station Brig where he has remained since April 2002, challenged the 
lawfulness of his confinement in the Norfolk Brig.  He maintained that 
the government’s detention of him without charges, access to a judicial 
tribunal, or the right to counsel violated the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.  In its opinion of August 16, 
2002, the district court ruled that the government’s declaration about 
Hamdi’s detention “falls far short” of supporting it.8  The district court 
ordered the government to turn over such materials as the names and 
addresses of all interrogators who had questioned Hamdi, copies of 
Hamdi’s statements, and the notes taken from interviews with him.9 
Reversing Judge Doumar’s ruling and order, the Fourth Circuit panel 
consisting of Judges Wilkinson, Wilkins, and Traxler maintained that the 
declaration by the government about Hamdi’s detention “is a sufficient 
basis upon which to conclude that the Commander in Chief has 
constitutionally detained Hamdi pursuant to the war powers entrusted to 
him by the United States Constitution.  No further factual inquiry is 
necessary or proper, and we remand the case with directions to dismiss 
the petition.”10 
 
 3. Id. at 221. 
 4. Id. at 225. 
 5. Id. at 224. 
 6. Id. at 225.  7. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).  8. Id. at 462.  9. Id.   10. Id. at 459. 
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Acknowledging that Hamdi’s dual status as both an American citizen 
and an alleged enemy combatant “raises important questions about the 
role of the courts in times of war,” Judge Wilkinson proceeded to 
confine the judiciary’s role to deferring to executive and military 
decisions, stressing “the importance of limitations on judicial activities 
during wartime.”11  The political branches are best positioned to 
comprehend the global war in its full context, he emphasized, “and 
neither the absence of set-piece battles nor the intervals of calm between 
terrorist assaults suffice to nullify the warmaking authority entrusted to 
the executive and legislative branches.”12  Not just a “somewhat 
different voice” but a dramatically different one rejected the need to 
probe Hamdi’s rights as a citizen.  Judge Wilkinson maintained, “For the 
judicial branch to trespass upon the exercise of the warmaking powers 
would be an infringement of the right to self-determination and self-
governance at a time when the care of the common defense is most 
critical.”13  The only semblance of recognition by the Fourth Circuit of 
the government’s obligation to control itself was its observation that 
“judicial deference to executive decisions made in the name of war is not 
unlimited.”14  However, no limitation could be placed on judicial 
deference to the executive in this instance, Judge Wilkinson concluded, 
because “military judgments in the field” were at the core of the 
government’s action detaining Hamdi.15 
That the judiciary will and, implicitly, should speak with a different 
voice depending on the wartime or peacetime context of actions and that 
replication of abdications from scrutiny of the executive and military 
should be expected to recur whenever a state of war exists jolts us away 
from John Marshall’s assurances in Marbury v. Madison that “[t]he 
government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws, and not of men” and that “[t]he very essence of 
civil liberty consists in the right of every individual to claim the 
protection of the laws, whenever he suffers an injury.”16 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s analysis was alarming in its fatalistic 
acceptance of the Latin maxim without even posing or probing 
 
 11. Id. at 462. 
 12. Id. at 464. 
 13. Id. at 463. 
 14. Id. at 464. 
 15. Id. at 465.  16. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
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justifications for its divergence from the principles of governance that 
animated Marshall’s Marbury opinion and other works of the 
Constitution’s Framers.  Notwithstanding their personal experiences 
with realities of warfare, the Framers did not calibrate their concern with 
limiting the power to govern according to whether war or peace was at 
hand.  Number 51 of the Federalist Papers stated clearly and unequivocally 
the priorities of government: “You must first enable the government to 
control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself.”17  
Self-control was not an option; it was an obligation.  And the means for 
self-control established by the Framers without regard to whether we 
were at war or peace were to be the system of separation of powers and 
checks and balances in which the powers and ambitions of each branch 
would operate to engage and limit the potential and likely excesses of the 
others.  Nat Nathanson and his coauthor Lou Jaffe summarized precisely 
the status of the separation of powers principle as “a fundamental and 
valid dogma” whose “object is the preservation of political safeguards 
against the capricious exercise of power.”18 
To countenance the silencing of the laws because of exigencies of 
wartime would be both destructive of a guiding principle embedded in 
our nation’s tradition of governance and a heedless, needless repudiation 
of salient and effective criteria that have enabled the government to 
perform its authorized tasks in times of crisis as well as times of calm 
without abandoning its obligation to control itself. 
The evolution of the administrative state in consonance with adherence to 
criteria that assure administrative agencies’ accountability and constrain 
them from unauthorized and arbitrary actions demonstrates the practicality 
and viability of achieving necessary and proper results through carefully 
articulated and consistently binding principles of law.  How did this salutary 
evolution come about?  At the outset, judicial willingness to accept in 
principle the constitutionality of administrative agency decisionmaking 
but judicial refusal to succumb to executive or legislative invocations of 
convenience and utility, and even their cries of “crisis” or “emergency” 
as justifications for bypassing traditional judicial modes and methods, 
played a key role. 
The 1932 case of Crowell v. Benson19 presented a prototype of this 
combination of willingness and refusal.  Challengers in Crowell of 
awards by the U.S. Employees Compensation Commission under the 
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act contended 
 
 17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).  18. LOUIS L. JAFFE & NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 33 (4th ed. 1976).  19. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
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that the statute unconstitutionally bestowed judicial power upon a 
nonjudicial body.  Rejecting the constitutional objection, the Court ruled 
that Congress may establish Article I “legislative” courts in exercising 
the powers confided to it, as distinguished from Article III 
“constitutional courts,” in which the judicial power conferred by the 
Constitution should be deposited.20  Congress could constitutionally 
utilize “a method shown by experience to be essential in order to apply 
its standards to the thousands of cases involved, thus relieving the courts 
of a most serious burden while preserving their complete authority to 
insure the proper application of the law.”21  However, recognition of the 
convenience and utility of administrative agencies “does not require the 
conclusion that there is no limitation of their use, and that the Congress 
could completely oust the courts of all determinations of fact by vesting 
the authority to make them with finality in its own instrumentalities or in 
the Executive Department.”22 
Chief Justice Hughes proceeded to stress that “[i]n cases brought to 
enforce constitutional rights, the judicial power of the United States 
necessarily extends to the independent determination of all questions, 
both of fact and law, necessary to the performance of that supreme 
function.”23  Trial de novo was mandated for “fundamental” or 
“jurisdictional” facts, whose “existence is a condition precedent to the 
operation of the statutory scheme.”24  The essential independence of the 
judicial power of the United States in enforcing constitutional rights 
“requires that the Federal court should determine such an issue upon its 
own record and the facts elicited before it.”25  Justice Brandeis, in 
dissent, maintained that de novo review in the district court of issues 
tried or triable before the Commission “will, I fear, gravely hamper the 
effective administration of the Act.”26  Nonetheless, Brandeis affirmed 
that “under certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due 
process is a requirement of judicial process.”27 
While trial de novo has not been imposed with draconian regularity in 
the aftermath of the Crowell decision, the Court’s insistence on the 
 
 20. Id. at 50. 
 21. Id. at 54. 
 22. Id. at 57. 
 23. Id. at 60. 
 24. Id. at 54. 
 25. Id. at 64. 
 26. Id. at 94 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 27. Id. at 87. 
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judiciary’s jurisdiction and authority in “cases brought to enforce 
constitutional rights” has been echoed from that time to this.28 
The Supreme Court’s invalidation of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act of 1933 (NIRA) in the Schechter Poultry case in 193529 offered a 
dramatic illustration of the view that requirements of constitutional 
regularity trump claims of crisis.  The immediate context for the statute was 
succinctly chronicled by Robert Stern in his 1946 Harvard Law Review 
article, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933–1946: 
The depression which began in the Fall of 1929 had, by 1933, produced an economic crisis probably unequalled in the history of the United States.  At least thirteen million persons were unemployed; . . . wages received in mining, manufacturing, construction and transportation had declined from 17 to 6.8 billion dollars.  Prices had fallen 37 per cent and industrial production had been cut almost in half.30 
Pursuant to that sweeping statute, codes of fair competition promulgated 
by industry and labor could become binding law upon receiving 
presidential approval without meeting or being subjected to congressionally 
prescribed standards and procedures.  Invocation of national crisis as a 
justification for shoddy procedure and unquestioning deference to 
executive judgment became a hallmark of the government’s unsuccessful 
effort to obtain legal approval for the NIRA.   
Chief Justice Hughes’s opinion for the unanimous court in A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States31 rejected the notion that crises 
can cure statutory defects and ruled the NIRA unconstitutional.  Hughes 
noted trenchantly: 
We are told that the provision of the statute authorizing the adoption of codes must be viewed in the light of the grave national crisis with which Congress was confronted.  Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power is addressed are always to be considered when the exercise of power is challenged.  Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies.  But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority.  Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.  The Constitution established a national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to be both in war and peace, but these powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional grants.  Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is necessary.32 
 
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Spagnolia v. Mathis, 809 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Atl. Coast R.R. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of S.C., 77 F. Supp. 675 (E.D.S.C. 1948).  29. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  30. Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933–1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 653 (1946) (footnotes omitted).  31. 295 U.S. 495. 
 32. Id. at 528–29 (footnote omitted). 
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The Chief Justice proceeded to contrast the procedural vagaries of the 
NIRA with the requirements the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act 
of 1914 established to govern operations of the then new administrative 
agency.  Specific procedures were set up by Congress for the FTC to 
follow.  “Provision was made for formal complaint, for notice and 
hearing, for appropriate findings of fact supported by adequate evidence, 
and for judicial review to give assurance that the action of the 
Commission is taken within its statutory authority.”33 
In providing for codes of fair competition, the NIRA, on the other hand, 
“dispenses with this administrative procedure and with any administrative 
procedure of an analogous character.”34  As Justice Cardozo stated in his 
concurring opinion, by setting up comprehensive bodies of rules to 
promote the welfare of industry without reference to standards—ethical 
or commercial—that could be known or predicted in advance of their 
adoption, drafters of the codes were engaged in “delegation running riot.”35 
President Truman’s invocation of “emergency” as justification for his 
order to the Secretary of Commerce temporarily to take over the steel 
industry during the Korean War in order to prevent an industry-wide 
strike that could interrupt the supply of war materials to our troops was 
repudiated by the Supreme Court’s 6–3 majority in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v.  Sawyer,36 notwithstanding the dissenters’ insistence that the 
President acted properly “to faithfully execute the laws by acting in an 
emergency to maintain the status quo.”37 
Justice Black’s opinion for the Court responded to the claim that the 
President’s action “was necessary to avert a national catastrophe . . . , 
and that in meeting this grave emergency the President was acting within 
the aggregate of his constitutional powers”38 by pointing out that: 
The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times.  It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice.  Such a review would but confirm our holding that this seizure order cannot stand.39 
In concurrence, Justice Frankfurter stressed that the Founders of the 
 
 33. Id. at 533. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).  36. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 37. Id. at 703 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. at 582. 
 39. Id. at 589. 
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Nation “rested the structure of our central government on the system of 
checks and balances.  For them the doctrine of separation of powers was 
not mere theory; it was felt necessity.”40  They “had no illusion that our 
people enjoyed biological or psychological or sociological immunities 
from the hazards of concentrated power.”41 
Echoing Frankfurter’s ode to the checks and balances of the 
Constitution, Justice Douglas observed that “[w]e pay a price for our 
system of checks and balances, for the distribution of power among the 
three branches of government.  It is a price that today may seem 
exorbitant to many.”42 
Justice Jackson took special note of and rejected the Solicitor 
General’s argument that “inherent” powers accruing from customs and 
claims of previous administrations authorize the President “to deal with 
a crisis or an emergency according to the necessities of the case, the 
unarticulated assumption being that necessity knows no law.”43  
Emphasizing that “[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, 
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of 
Congress,”44 Justice Jackson concluded his separate concurrence with an 
eloquent reminder of the core of free government: “With all its defects, 
delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long  
preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, 
and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.”45 
Our nation would have been worse off if the Supreme Court had 
deferred in Crowell to blandishments of convenience and utility or in 
Schechter and in Youngstown to claims of crisis and emergency as 
justifications for abandoning traditional instruments and modes of 
minimally fair procedure.  The economic crisis of the 1930s was met 
post-Schechter with resilient and imaginative governmental action that 
adhered to norms of fundamental fairness.  And the “emergency” 
invoked to support President Truman’s seizure of the steel industry to 
prevent interruption of war materials to our troops in Korea was resolved 
in the quick sequences of immediate presidential compliance with the 
Court’s ruling, a fifty-three-day strike by the steelworkers that did not 
produce a steel shortage, and a negotiated settlement culminating in 
acceptable wage and price increases. 
That the Court blew its whistle on Truman’s seizure while the issue 
was at white heat and that the President summarily obeyed the Justices 
 
 40. Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 43. Id. at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 44. Id. at 635. 
 45. Id. at 655. 
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and restored the industry to its private owners were manifestations of and 
tributes to the resoluteness of American commitment to the rule of law. 
President Truman’s example of compliance was, fortunately, 
replicated by President Nixon in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in United States v. Nixon that the presumptive privilege of the President 
of confidentiality of communication “must be considered in light of our 
historic commitment to the rule of law.”46 
Concluding that “when the ground for asserting privilege as to 
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on 
the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the 
fundamental demands of due process of law,”47 the Court sustained the 
order to President Nixon to produce the recordings and documents 
subpoenaed by the Special Prosecutor.  Along the route to the Court’s 8–0 
ruling against the President, the Court rejected the argument that the 
matter was not subject to judicial resolution because it was an 
intrabranch dispute.  John Marshall’s declaration in Marbury that it is 
“emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is” was pointedly reaffirmed by Chief Justice Burger.48 
The Court performed its duty in refuting President Nixon’s 
generalized claim of executive privilege, and the President followed 
through on his duty by complying with the Court’s ruling. 
Although a far cry from the sensitive matters of state involved in the 
Youngstown and Nixon cases, the sexual harassment allegations of Paula 
Jones against President Clinton once again involved the issue of 
presidential compliance with the rule of law.  In Clinton v. Jones, the 
Justices obliged a sitting President, over his fierce objection, to arrange 
to testify in response to a complaint about actions allegedly taken by him 
before his presidential term began.49  The Supreme Court ruled that it 
was an abuse of discretion for the district court to defer the trial of Ms. 
Jones’s case until after the President leaves office.  Said Justice Stevens 
for the Court, “[T]he doctrine of separation of powers does not require 
federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves 
office.”50  Marbury, Youngstown, and Nixon were invoked to support the 
proposition that the Court has the authority to determine whether the 
 
 46. 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974). 
 47. Id. at 713.  48. Id. at 703 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).  49. 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
 50. Id. at 705–06. 
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President’s claimed immunity while in office was within the law.51 
Most of my colleagues and much of the press on all sides of the 
political spectrum criticized the Court for allegedly interfering with the 
President’s performance of his primary governmental duties.  Any 
obligation to respond to the Jones charges should have awaited 
completion of his presidential term, they maintained.  I’ve been an 
unstinting admirer of Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court, which 
supported accommodation to presidential scheduling needs but insisted, 
nonetheless, that President Clinton be accountable to judicial process 
while serving in office. 
Two other cases—one presidential, the other congressional—that 
sought to validate institutional shortcuts that bypassed constitutional 
requirements in the name of efficiency warrant consideration at this 
juncture.  Both sought to alter constitutional provisions for exercising 
vetoes.  In INS v. Chadha, Congress’s use of the legislative veto, 
pursuant to which the legislature reserved to itself in particular statutes 
the power to veto rules and regulations adopted by administrative 
agencies, was ruled unconstitutional by a vote of 7–2.52  In Clinton v. 
New York, authorization by Congress to the President to exercise the line 
item veto, pursuant to which the President could cancel particular 
provisions of discretionary budget authority, new direct spending 
authority, or limited tax benefits—and no longer be required to veto such 
measures in their entirety or not at all—was ruled unconstitutional by a 
vote of 6–3.53  Arguments for both kinds of vetoes were couched in 
national need for greater institutional efficiency. 
Writing for the Court in the Chadha case, Chief Justice Burger 
declared that the President’s participation in the legislative process, 
through the presentment clause and his veto power, “was to protect the 
Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from 
improvident laws.”54  The legislative veto: 
doubtless has been in many respects a convenient shortcut; . . . but it is crystal clear from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency.  The records of the Convention and debates in the states preceding ratification underscore the common desire to define and limit the exercise of the newly created federal powers affecting the states and the people.  There is unmistakable expression of a determination that legislation by the national Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process.55 
 
 51. See id. at 703–04.  52. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  53. Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 54. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
 55. Id. at 958–59. 
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That the Justices were not confining their rejection of procedural 
shortcuts to the legislature was made clear in the paragraph that followed 
their call for “deliberate and deliberative process.”  They stated: 
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked.  There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President.  With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.56 
The Line Item Veto Act, like the legislative veto, was held to violate 
the Presentment Clause of Article I, Section 7.57  “Although the 
Constitution expressly authorized the President to play a role in the 
process of enacting statutes, it is silent on the subject of unilateral 
Presidential action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted 
statutes,” Justice Stevens maintained: 
There are powerful reasons for construing  constitutional silence on this profoundly important issue as equivalent to an express prohibition. . . .  Our first President understood the text of the Presentment Clause as requiring that he either “approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto.” . . . . 
If there is to be a new procedure in which the President will play a different role in determining the final text of what may “become a law,” such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution.58 
The key cases holding Congress and the Chief Executive accountable 
to the rule of law are salient models of constitutional reasoning and 
policy that should banish from law’s lexicon any sweeping doctrine that 
our basic laws are ever silent.  The Justices’ odes to compliance with 
constitutional prescriptions and mandates have trumped claims of 
efficiency, crisis, and emergency that parallel claimed exigencies of 
wartime, and we are the better for the traditions the Court and the 
complying Congresses and Presidents have honored. 
 
 56. Id. at 959 (citation omitted).  57. Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. at 421. 
 58. Id. at 439–40, 449 (quoting 33 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 96 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940)). 
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As embodied in the precedents examined, goals of efficiency and 
fairness have been concomitants for implementation as the judiciary has 
confronted the alleged necessities for burgeoning administrative powers.  
Overall, we have been successful in enabling and encouraging federal 
agencies fully to perform responsibilities and exercise appropriate 
discretion while demanding of them adherence to basic principles of 
fairness and what Ken Davis called “a full structuring of discretionary 
power—findings, reasons, precedents, checks through appeals and 
through internal supervision, and procedural protections.”59  Let us 
reexamine several additional landmark cases that supported the capacity 
of government agencies to operate expeditiously and efficiently while 
holding them accountable to standards and principles of the rule of law.  
They provide models for emulation and enforcement, whatever the 
momentary challenges our nation may face. 
In chronological order, the Chenery cases,60 Universal Camera,61 
Florida East Coast,62  Mathews v. Eldridge,63 State Farm,64 Heckler v. 
Chaney,65 Chevron,66 Webster v. Doe,67 and Zadvydas68 make it to my 
hit parade, though other worthy candidates abound. 
The two Chenery decisions of the Supreme Court, in 1943 and 1947, 
while embodying bitter differences among the Justices at the time over 
the devices and scope of agency power, produced core, lasting black 
letter doctrines both channeling and supporting agency expertise and 
discretion.  In Chenery I, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court’s 
majority, declared the principle that “[t]he grounds upon which an 
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record 
discloses that its action was based.”69  Judicial review was not to 
countenance post hoc agency rationalization.  Agency action must be 
measured by what the record established in the case contains.  Chenery 
II, written by Justice Murphy, with Frankfurter and Jackson in vigorous 
dissent, did not disturb Chenery I’s rule about the record but did reject 
Justice Frankfurter’s implication there that rulemaking rather than 
adjudication must be utilized for enunciation of new agency policy.70  
 
 59. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 207 (1969).  60. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).  61. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).  62. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).  63. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  64. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  65. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).  66. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  67. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).  68. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).  69. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943). 
 70. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1947). 
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Chenery II made clear that agencies may choose to proceed either by 
rulemaking or adjudication.  “In performing its important functions,” 
Murphy stressed, “an administrative agency must be equipped to act 
either by general rule or by individual order.  To insist upon one form of 
action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.”71 
In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB in 1951, Justice Frankfurter 
expanded on what was meant by the record, pursuant to requirements of 
the Administrative Procedure Act and the National Labor Relations Act, 
in determining whether substantial evidence is present to justify agency 
action.72  It was upon “the whole record” that the agency action was to 
be evaluated, and the “whole record” includes the findings and report of 
the hearing examiner (now titled “administrative law judge”) in the 
case.73  Although the examiner could be reversed by the agency without 
proof that his findings were clearly erroneous, “evidence supporting a 
conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced 
examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has 
drawn conclusions different from the Board’s than when he has reached 
the same conclusion.”74  Reviewing courts should give to the examiner’s 
report “such probative force as it intrinsically commands.”75  Thus, the 
Supreme Court ruled, the court of appeals had erred in holding that it 
was barred from taking into account the report of the hearing examiner 
insofar as it was rejected by the agency.  Justice Frankfurter’s Universal 
Camera opinion eloquently and with nuanced perception about agency 
roles and needs crafted a credible, serviceable guide for judicial review 
that accorded for the first time official status and stature to the hearing 
examiner’s vital role. 
Fairness of the administrative process did not require that its processes 
be mirror images of the courts’.  Flexibility could go hand in hand with 
fairness.  According hearing examiners, who could be removed from 
office only “for good cause,” an explicit role in assessing whether 
substantial evidence is present in the whole record to justify agency 
action was an important accompaniment in achieving fairness to 
requiring that the record of the case and not post hoc rationalizations 
justify the action taken. 
 
 71. Id. at 202. 
 72. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
 73. Id. at 488, 496. 
 74. Id. at 496. 
 75. Id. at 495. 
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At the same time, flexibility of agency procedure could be encouraged.  
As Chenery II  made clear, the agency could choose whether to proceed 
by rulemaking or adjudication.  And, as Richardson v. Perales in 1971 
ruled, examiners could not only admit hearsay, such as written medical 
reports not subjected to cross-examination, as evidence, but such 
evidence could constitute substantial evidence to justify agency action.76 
Lower courts were cautioned in United States v. Florida East Coast 
Railway Co. not to impose on agencies requirements not specified in 
their enabling statutes or the Administrative Procedure Act.77  In addition, 
whereas agency adjudications were clearly subject to compliance with 
due process as well as statutory standards, agency adoptions of policies 
in typical rulemaking proceedings were governed only by statutory 
provisions and were not subjected to due process scrutiny. 
Where due process was triggered, as in agency adjudications, the 
standards to be observed beyond notice and an opportunity to respond 
were the products of a judicial balancing process.  As Justice Powell put 
it in Mathews v. Eldridge in 1976: 
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.78 
Concerned about “the torpidity” of the review process in social 
security disability cases and the heavy administrative burden and the 
other societal costs requiring evidentiary pretermination hearings would 
impose, the Court in Mathews concluded that such evidentiary hearings 
were not mandated by due process in disability cases.79  The agency’s 
provisions of notice, availability to claimants of information in the 
record, and opportunity for claimants to respond in writing and submit 
additional evidence prior to termination were sufficient to meet the 
constitutional standard in this instance. 
Without corroding flexibility, the Court in Motor Vehicles Manufacturers 
Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. in 1983 stressed 
as a component of fairness that, although a court must not substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency, “[the reviewing court] may not supply a 
reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not 
 
 76. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971).  77. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 238–41 (1973).  78. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 79. Id. at 342, 349. 
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given.”80  An agency rule must normally be rejected as arbitrary and 
capricious: 
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.81 
Judicial review should determine whether the agency has examined 
the relevant data and articulated “a satisfactory explanation for its action 
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.’”82  Lacking a record of such a rational connection, the rescission 
of its previously adopted passive restraint seat belt requirement was 
ruled arbitrary and capricious.  “We have frequently reiterated that an 
agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a 
given manner; and we reaffirm this principle again today,” Justice White 
concluded.83 
The need for cogent explanation and articulation of a rational connection 
between facts found and choice made was not abandoned or 
compromised when the Court in its famous Chevron decision in 1984 
summarized and codified applicable principles of deference to agency 
interpretations of their enabling statutes’ provisions.84  In order to decide 
whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had construed the 
statutory term “stationary source” reasonably when it treated all of the 
pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though 
they were within a single “bubble,” the Court set forth a codificatory 
mantra of criteria to govern judicial review: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.  First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
 
 80. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 83. Id. at 48–49 (citations omitted). 
 84. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether an agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.85 
If Congress, explicitly or implicitly, has left a gap for the agency to 
fill, there is a delegation of authority to the agency.  “In such a case, a 
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for 
a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”86  
The Chevron Court scrutinized the statute and found that it did not speak 
directly to the “bubble concept” at issue.  Then, reviewing the action of 
the EPA’s administrator, the Court found that “the regulatory scheme is 
technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed 
and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting 
policies.”87  Consonant with these findings, Justice Stevens concluded 
for the Court that “the Administrator’s interpretation represents a 
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is 
entitled to deference.”88  The EPA’s definition of the statutory term 
“source” is “a permissible construction of the statute which seeks to 
accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with economic growth.”89 
I’m aware that dictum toward the end of Justice Stevens’s opinion in 
Chevron instructs judges to butt out when wisdom of agency policy is 
the central issue, for “federal judges—who have no constituency—have 
a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”90  It 
is still for the courts to decide whether a challenge to agency 
construction of a statutory provision really centers on the wisdom of 
legitimate agency policy choice or whether it centers on the 
reasonableness of choice within a gap left open by Congress.  Having 
found the agency’s statutory construction in Chevron to be “permissible” 
and “reasonable” after detailed probing, the Court in the Chevron case 
itself certainly performed its scrutinizing role.  Post-Chevron decisions 
have added to the judiciary’s task when claims of deference are made by 
agencies the obligation to decide whether Chevron deference and its 
mantra are applicable or whether the somewhat less deferential standard 
of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.91 is to be utilized.  Skidmore’s terminology 
for deference, it will be recalled, was that administrative rulings, 
interpretations, and opinions: 
 
 85. Id. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted). 
 86. Id. at 844. 
 87. Id. at 865 (footnotes omitted). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 866. 
 90. Id.  91. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.  The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.92 
Deference under both Skidmore and Chevron was to be the end 
product of judicial inquiry into and assessment of text and legislative 
history of the applicable statute and the record, reasoning, and 
explication for its action by the agency. 
Judicial determinations about deference to agency constructions of 
statutory language are components, not bypasses, of judicial review.  
Can all judicial review of agency practices be precluded or denied?  
Clearly, judicial review can be dispensed with where agency practices 
are governed solely by statute.  Can it be denied to constitutional 
challenges as well?  Compliance with cases like Crowell v. Benson 
would surely mandate a “no” answer.  In truth, the Court’s more recent 
decisions have been cagey on this point.  None has ruled that 
constitutional challenges can be foreclosed, but none either has ruled 
that they cannot. 
We know from Abbott Laboratories and Overton Park that judicial 
review of administrative action is presumed in statutory cases, but that 
review in such instances can be denied directly by the statute or “where 
‘agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.’”93  The Court 
has also ruled that judicial review is unobtainable in statutory cases 
when there is “no law to apply.”94  What of constitutional challenges? 
Even when the Supreme Court reformulated the doctrine of presumption 
of judicial review in Heckler v. Chaney in 1985 to exclude agency 
inaction from the presumption,95 Justice Rehnquist was careful to note, 
in writing for the Court, that “[n]o colorable claim is made in this case 
that the agency’s refusal to institute proceedings violated any 
constitutional rights of respondents, and we do not address the issue that 
would be raised in such a case.”96 
 
 92. Id. at 140.  93. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting Abbot Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 96. Id. at 838. 
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Concurring in the opinion, Justice Brennan noted that: 
the Court properly does not decide today that nonenforcement decisions are unreviewable in cases where (1) an agency flatly claims that it has no statutory jurisdiction to reach certain conduct; (2) an agency engages in a pattern of nonenforcement of clear statutory language . . . ; (3) an agency has refused to enforce a regulation lawfully promulgated and still in effect; or (4) a nonenforcement decision violates constitutional rights.97 
The Court revisited the issue of reviewability of claims of 
constitutional rights in Webster v. Doe in 1988, a case brought by a 
dismissed employee of the Central Intelligence Agency.98  Explicitly, the 
Court went so far as to say that the dismissed employee’s constitutional 
claims were reviewable.   
[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear. . . .  We require this heightened showing in part to avoid the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.99 
A majority of the Court, invoking Crowell v. Benson, reiterated in 
Zadvydas v. Davis in 2001 the “‘cardinal principle’ of statutory 
interpretation . . . that when an Act of Congress raises ‘a serious doubt’ 
as to its constitutionality, ‘this Court will first ascertain whether a 
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may 
be avoided.’”100 
Ruling that habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for 
statutory and constitutional challenges to detentions of aliens who have 
been ordered removed beyond the postremoval period, the Court avoided 
deciding whether the statute that could be read to authorize permanent 
indefinite detention was constitutional or not.  “In our view,” wrote 
Justice Breyer, “the statute, read in light of the Constitution’s demands, 
limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably 
necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.  It 
does not permit indefinite detention.”101  As far as its view of black letter 
constitutional law was concerned, the Court went no farther than to 
reserve, without exercising, its ultimate authority over constitutional 
questions.  Citing Superintendent v. Hill (and, again, Crowell, this time 
Brandeis’s recognition in his dissent that “under certain circumstances, 
the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial 
 
 97. Id. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  98. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
 99. Id. at 603 (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)).    100. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). 
 101. Id. 
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process”102), Justice Breyer said: “This Court has suggested . . . that the 
Constitution may well preclude granting ‘an administrative body the 
unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental 
rights.’”103  The Court did dismiss the government’s claim that Congress 
has “plenary power” to create immigration law and that the judiciary 
must defer to executive and legislative decisions in that realm with a 
succinct rebuttal, citing Chadha, “[b]ut that power is subject to 
important constitutional limitations.”104 
Puzzlingly, after reiterating that an alien’s liberty interest raises a 
serious question as to whether the Constitution permits indefinite 
detention, Justice Breyer declared: “Despite this constitutional problem, 
‘if Congress has made its intent’ in the statute ‘clear, “we must give 
effect to that intent.”’”105 
The Court made a special point of noting further that the issues in 
Zadvydas do not:  
require us to consider the political branches’ authority to control entry into the United States. . . .  Neither do we consider terrorism or other special circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security.106 
The Zadvydas ruling was handed down two and a half months before 
9/11.  What hope can there be that in a post-9/11 world, the Court will 
reaffirm commitment, not only to traditional norms of statutory 
interpretation to avoid conflicts with constitutional law, but to the 
primacy of the constitutional limitations when the conflict cannot be 
avoided? 
This issue may well be in the same orbit as that labeled “academic” by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in All the Laws But One, as he expressed the 
certainty that Presidents faced with wartime crises would deal with them 
as they had in the past, without distraction by or attention to civil 
liberties concerns, and that the Court would respond in similar fashion, 
upholding the President’s actions and shelving resolution of 
constitutional conflicts until crisis abates and normalcy returns.107 
 
 102. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 87.  103. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450 (1985)). 
 104. Id. at 695 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941–42 (1983)). 
 105. Id. at 696 (quoting Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000)). 
 106. Id. at 695–96. 
 107. See REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 224. 
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I can’t refute that the approach set forth by the Chief Justice may 
prevail.  I believe, however,  that such an approach would fly in the face 
of key decisions by the Court that honored and burnished our 
commitment to constitutional governance and the accountability of 
power. 
The Constitution is not a showpiece, facade, or Orwellian work of 
“doublethink” that was written to shield reprehensible practices from 
confrontation and repudiation or “spin” them into less deadly, more 
acceptable euphemisms (as has been done with the term “collateral 
damage”).  The Constitution sets forth principles and recipe to “enable 
the government to control the governed” and “oblige it to control 
itself.”108  It has served to correct and surmount abuses of power, 
whether by legislature or President or both.  It does not countenance 
maintaining two versions of constitutional bookkeeping (Enron-style 
bookkeeping)—one for evaluating actions taken in peacetime, the other 
for bowing to or bypassing evaluating actions taken in war. 
Steven Brill’s recent book After: How America Confronted the 
September 12 Era is comforting in its finding that “[a]lthough American 
freedoms and the legal system that protects its people have been tested 
and even changed, Americans are still fundamentally free. . . .  How 
Americans live has been indelibly affected.  But the country’s core 
values and way of life remain the same.”109  Reassuring, too, was a talk 
last week by Justice Breyer at the American Society of International 
Law, in which he maintained that courts, including his own, are fully 
aware of mistakes made in American history, including the holding in 
camps during World War II of Americans of Japanese ancestry.110 
I close with words from the Supreme Court’s past that, in conjunction 
with the cases considered earlier that implemented principled and viable 
standards for fusing needed polices with fundamental fairness, would do 
more credit to the Chief Justice for replication and application today 
than the Constitution-denigrating maxim inter arma silent leges that he 
invokes.  These words, from Ex parte Milligan, are noted by the Chief 
Justice in his book, but are treated by him more like hyperbolic dicta 
than as authentic declarations of binding constitutional interpretation: 
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.  No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of 
 
 108. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).  109. STEVEN BRILL, AFTER: HOW AMERICA CONFRONTED THE SEPTEMBER 12 ERA 623–24 (2003).  110. Stephen G. Breyer, The Supreme Court and the New International Law, Address Before the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4, 2003). 
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 111. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–21 (1866) (footnotes omitted); Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 129. 
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